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Abstract
This work looks at the scientific program of NASA during the Space Race. (1961- 1975)
During this period of the Cold War, NASA shifted it role from a political asset of the United
States strategy to an agency of scientific discovery. This was not a smooth transition due to
political opinions on the wastefulness and role of NASA. Many politicians, citizens and even
scientists had doubts about the scientific potential of NASA’s manned missions to the Moon.
Despite the power politics, the administrators at NASA were able to break out of the political
arena and create a balanced program where science became the driving force. From Apollo 11,
where only a tiny science instrument kit was deployed, to Skylab, a space station that showed off
NASA’s scientific potential. Unfortunately, NASA was unable to fully slip out of its political
chains and was dragged back into the Cold War when it was tasked with meeting up with
Russian cosmonauts in orbit. This work argues that due to pressure from outside forces, NASA
had to modify, broaden, and sometimes eliminate its scientific agenda depending on the stage
and politics of the Cold War.
I show within this work that, as mission planning progressed, NASA administrators and
scientists pushed to increase the science with every mission. From Apollo 11, where only a tiny
science instrument kit was deployed, to Skylab, a space station that showed off NASA’s
scientific potential. Using mission reports and memos from within the agency, NASA pursued
the policy of science-based missions, even when outside forces conspired to slow or even stop
the agency’s agenda. This work contributes to the discussion of history of science and
technology during the Cold War as well as adding to discourse of diplomatic history as seen in
the chapter on the Apollo-Soyuz test project.
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Introduction: Connections of History and Science

How does science progress? This question is on the mind of many who step in a lab and
perform scientific inquiry. It is also on the minds of those who chronicle and analyze the
progress of science. Positivists see scientists as adding to the “stockpile” of science.1 Positivist
historians of science did not look at the context in which these “great heroes” conducted their
scientific efforts. NASA scientists, to positivists, would not be influenced by the politics of the
Cold War.
However, in 1962, Thomas Kuhn disassembled this notion of sequestered scientists
sitting in their labs, oblivious to the outside world. In his work, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn stated that the historian of science can look at smaller non-revolutionary
topics of scientific research and how they related to their time.2 Kuhn uses the example of
Aristotle. How did Aristotle relate to those around him? Kuhn states that we should not ask how
Aristotle related to modern scientific theory.3 Kuhn believes that looking at how new scientific
thinking in the context of its time allows historians to see a shift of normal science, or dominate
scientific thinking, to extraordinary science, seen as the buildup of anomalies against normal
science. This “paradigm shift” in thinking led social historians to go further and question the
relationships between scientists and power politics. The social historians of science during the
1960’s found the heroes of science were steeped in the political power relations of their time, not
just fiddling with their experiments.4 They insisted the conflict of ideas is really between the
1
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people that hold them.5 In this conflict is where scientific revolutions and changes in thought
reside. These social historians portrayed ideas that explain why a nation would involve itself in
space exploration.
The narrative of why a nation decides to go to space has been filtered through many
lenses over the decades since the first rocket launch. At first “Lumpers,” as Stephen J Pyne calls
them, declared the space age as an extension of the European practice of exploration and
colonization.6 Lumper historians like William Goetzmann stated that space endeavors fit the
mold of earlier exploration.7 However, Pyne marks a split from this line of thought in the 1960’s,
the same time Kuhn was developing his paradigm shift. “Splitters” theorized that space
exploration diverged from Goetzmann’s second great age of discovery into its own distinct age.8
This group places space exploration in its own category with exploration of Antarctica and the
deep oceans, places where humans cannot exist without help.
Although historians of space exploration situated spaceflight fit on the timeline of human
exploration, none of the lumpers or splitters dealt with how nations justified sending humans to
space. Roger D. Launius, former chief historian at NASA, identified five themes that the social
historians of the 1960’s and 1970’s used to justify large scale space exploration agenda. These
include human destiny and survival; geopolitical and national pride and prestige; national
security and military applications; economic competitiveness and scientific discovery and
understanding. Identification of these themes by modern social historians was a break from the
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traditional thinking that heroes of science were smarter and more creative than everyone else.9
As seen in the changing ideas in the history of science as a whole, agents of space exploration
from the top down were affected by their time. These social historians eventually broadened
these themes to fit four categories: political, social, technological, and cultural reasons for
explorations of space.10 Historians now relate space exploration to the context of the Cold War,
diplomatic history and the history of science and technology.
This broader Cold War context mixed with United States relations with the Soviet Union
and NASA’s need to push science internally is where the heart of my work lies. I argue that due
to pressure from outside forces, NASA had to modify, broaden, and sometimes completely scrap
its scientific agenda depending on the stage and politics of the Cold War. NASA personnel and
scientists were not shielded from the power politics and relations of the Cold War as the
positivist historians might have claimed. On the contrary, NASA personnel and scientists drove
change within the agency’s scientific program. While engineering objectives remained first and
foremost on many minds looking at the program, these people pushed to make sure science was
included as much as possible. At many points during the Apollo Program, NASA was an agent
of and in control of their program objectives. At other points, it was beholden to the politics of
their time. In the end, despite the pressure of Cold War politics, the agency maintained and
completed a successful scientific program.
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Chapter 1:1961-1969: Science Takes a Backseat

I: The Role of Science in the US Space Program

With the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s first flight in April 1961, the
USSR firmly took the lead in the emerging Space Race with the United States. Prior to John F.
Kennedy’s challenge to the Nation in May 1961, NASA had still not conceptualized the sciencerelated goals of its infant Moon landing program. However, the president received many reports
from his science advisory committee. In January 1961, Jerome Wiesner, chairman of the
president’s committee, submitted a report to Kennedy outlining specific and important areas in
the field of space science. Wiesner and his team recommended scientific objectives should have
a prominent place in the planning of space goals and missions, wide participation by scientists
should be encouraged, the program needed adequate financial support, and wisdom and foresight
was necessary in the selection of science mission and scientists.1 Outside of the government, the
Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, an organization founded in 1863 to
serve as science consultants to the United States government, was NASA’s chief scientific
advisor.2 In early 1969, the board published a paper entitled “Man’s role in the National Space
Program” in which it proposed that the goal of the space program should be scientific
exploration but recognized that non-technical factors were necessary for national public
acceptance. Yet declaring that the nation would go to the Moon just for scientific reasons had
limited appeal. Divisions along these lines existed within the scientific community itself. Lunar

1
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science was not as practiced as space science.3 The majority of scientists focusing on spacebased science not only studied the Moon, but they also studied all other celestial bodies in our
solar system. Those in the scientific community who called themselves space scientists felt
threatened by an endeavor to explore the Moon. Many feared Congress, to fund the Moon
landing program and by extension lunar science, would slash funding for non-Apollo related
projects.4 This fear would prevail through much of the 1960s. The operational motif of NASA
during the 1960s up until the first Moon landing revolved around the idea that scientific
endeavors will naturally develop in the process of landing a man in the moon.
In February 1961, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics held hearings in
which NASA informed Congress of its plans. George Low, chief of Manned Space Flight,
described Apollo to the committee as an Earth orbiting laboratory and a program in which a
flight around the Moon could be achieved, eventually leading to a landing.5 Other administrators
outlined objectives for the Mercury and Gemini programs which served as lead up and training
for Apollo. However, during the hearing, on April 12, the Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin
became the first man ever to launch into space. This shocked the nation, and Congress responded
to the news. The committee’s chairman, Rep. Overton Brooks (D-LA), stated very seriously “my
objective, and this is speaking individually, is to beat the Russians.” Robert Seamans, associate
administrator of NASA, told the committee that to achieve that objective, they would need to
accelerate the program and that would need to coincide with considerable infusion of money
from Congress. President Kennedy agreed and asked for an increase of more than $125 million
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over the $1.11 billion that President Eisenhower earmarked in fiscal 1961.6 This increase was
submitted to Congress officially and also publicly through President Kennedy’s challenge to the
nation to land a man on the Moon by the end of the decade. However, as NASA continued to
learn throughout the decade, increased funding increased pressure for results in engineering
endeavors, not scientific discovery. Therefore, the agency had to follow the Cold War objective
of beating the Russians first. Everything else was secondary. Following Kennedy’s challenge,
NASA got to work shaping the program that would put a man on the Moon. On May 8, 1961, the
agency submitted its “Recommendation for National Space Program,” also known as the Apollo
Charter inside NASA. The charter delineated the reasoning for undertaking space projects:
scientific knowledge, military value, improve commercial or civilian projects, and national
prestige.7 The charter highlighted the first and foremost of the agency’s goals:
Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have just done, lend
national prestige even though scientific, commercial, or military value of the
undertaking may by ordering standards be marginal or economically
unjustified.8
Again, officials at NASA understood that establishing science a cornerstone and major hallmark
of their program would not allow them to gain the support to accomplish Kennedy’s goal by
1969. NASA Administrator James Webb, however, was one of the champions for elevating
science to a significant place in the program. In a memo to NASA program offices on July 5,
1961, Webb encouraged NASA personnel to facilitate the process of feedback in order to

6
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improve “spinoffs” of the agency’s programs.9 Webb felt that if the employees of NASA could
be open with their ideas, the agency could create new knowledge and technology which in turn
could justify spending. NASA’s administrators committed themselves then to ideas first as a
defense for spending on scientific spinoffs, not committing money for increasing scientific
objectives for science’s sake. This way of allocating funding provides a major indication that
internally, NASA officials saw the importance and need of a science-based program. As
evidenced by the Webb memo, and throughout the decade, NASA supported many non-obvious
[subtle but effective?] techniques of adding science to their manned spaceflight program. Yet this
unwillingness to push science publicly led to a backlash from NASA’s few supporters in the
science community.
There was not unanimous excitement following Kennedy’s historic challenge to beat the
Russians to the Moon. Many of the skeptics came from the scientific community who feared
emphasis on a lunar landing program would not advance or could possibly damage scientific
discoveries in other areas of space science. Those who were already feeling the sting of a lunar
program worked for NASA’s unmanned space program. By late 1960, the increased focus and
allocation of funds for manned spaceflight reduced or eliminated work on more sophisticated
unmanned satellites that would be entirely science based.10 Things got worse in the 1960s for
those working in the unmanned program. Following Kennedy’s challenge, NASA Deputy
Director Hugh L. Dryden told the Senate Space Committee that Apollo planners would need data
from the unmanned Ranger probes for information about the lunar surface.11 Congress agreed
9
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and told the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the NASA field center in California that serves as the hub
for construction and research of unmanned probes, to comply with anything Apollo needed. This
caused sour feelings within the community of scientists working at JPL because NASA
managers moved in and changed Ranger’s specifications. They removed existing experiments
that scientists worked on for years and outfitted the probe with equipment to help Apollo. It
infuriated the scientists even further to learn that the information from the new equipment ended
up coming back too late and did not affect the construction of the Lunar Module, the vehicle that
separated from the command module and landed on the Moon. This case is an example of some
NASA administrators not respecting departments committed to science due to financial and
public pressure. The scales of engineering versus science in the unmanned flight community
weighed heavy on the side of science. Early manned flight had yet to push science directives as
mission driving decisions.
This atmosphere of interference in scientific matters explains why many scientists were
not onboard for going to the Moon. Many scientists, especially those in academia, enjoyed the
privilege of not being told what to investigate.12 They saw it as a perk of their profession to
investigate scientific questions and problems of their choice. When NASA recruited these
scientists, the objectives of the scientists and the objectives of the agency did not always fit
together. This became evident to those scientists working within the Office of Manned Space
Flight (OMSF). When the OMSF, the engineering division of NASA responsible for determining
how to accomplish getting to and landing on the Moon, began requesting specific scientific

12
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experiments and inquiry to be worked on for the Apollo lunar landings, many scientists
resolutely refused.
However, despite many scientists’ feelings toward the OMSF, the engineering office did
not always dictate how the science should operate and be conducted. In March 1962, the OMSF
worked with the Space Science Steering Committee to suggest scientific tasks that could be
performed by astronauts on future missions. The committee formed a working group chaired by
Charles B. Sonett of the Lunar and Planetary Program office and included members from OMSF
and Office of Space Sciences (OSS).13 Homer Newell oversaw the OSS, and he attempted to run
the office along guidelines that would best serve the scientific community under his direction. He
allowed scientists under the OSS to pursue any experiment they thought was worthwhile. Newell
felt that “pure science experiments will provide the engineering answers for Apollo.”14 OSS
explained engineering guidelines to the Sonett committee, and they were left to decide what the
scientific priorities where for a manned Moon landing. They concluded that the priorities of
Apollo science should include measurements, qualitative observations, experiments on samples
recovered from the Moon, and placing instruments on the lunar surface.15 The committee also
expressed concern about the training and scientific background of astronauts (this will be
explored further in Chapter 2). This was the first time that science (OSS) and Apollo engineering
(OMSF) started working closely together.
To unify the goals and conclusions of the OMSF and OSS, a working group replaced ad
hoc committees in both organizations in September 1962.16 Eugene Shoemaker, a geologist and

13
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scientist serving on the unmanned Ranger program, became the head of the group. The group
ensured that each office met each other’s needs. The group also notified the outside science
community of NASA’s scientific objectives to appear more transparent and quell concerns. As
one of Shoemaker’s first priorities, he asked the Manned Spacecraft Center, in Houston, Texas
facility that trained astronauts and was the home of mission control, to instruct astronauts in the
field of geology. Max Faget, director of Engineering and Development at MSC, agreed and
wrote a letter to Bob Gilruth, head of MSC, who approved the idea.17 On July 30, 1963, NASA
reorganized Shoemaker’s group into the Manned Space Science Division. It kept its same
responsibilities but could carry them out at a higher administrative level.18 Both Eugene
Shoemaker and Max Faget are examples of scientists Kuhn wrote about, not content to allow the
powers above them direct their scientific future. They engaged in the power politics of NASA in
order to direct the agency’s approach to science.
NASA also looked outside of its offices for advice on scientific priorities. In Summer
1962, a conference sponsored by NASA and the National Academy of Sciences published A
Review of Space Research.19 Those in attendance concluded that the important scientific tasks for
the program should include observing scientific phenomena, collection of samples, and
installation of monitoring equipment. It seemed that by the early 1960s, the scientific community
was on the same page regarding what NASA should be doing in the field of science during the
journey to landing a man on the Moon. Now they have to convince others.
II: United States Government versus Scientists

17
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By the end of 1962, the United States government was at odds with NASA over the space
agency’s immediate goals how to achieve them before the USSR. In November 1962, President
Kennedy met with NASA Administrator James Webb to discuss how the program should be
shaped. Shortly before this meeting, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, David E. Bell, sent
a memo to the president about how Webb was set to move funds from Apollo to other
departments. Bell expressed fear of NASA becoming “a one program agency,” but he felt the
landing was so urgent that funds should not be removed from it for other scientific endeavors.20
Webb felt that while the Apollo lunar landing had the highest priority, a balanced program
needed to have a place in mission planning and execution.21 Webb argued that “a broad based
space science program provides necessary support to the achievement of manned spaceflight
leading to the lunar landing.”22 Webb would champion science throughout his tenure as
administrator of NASA. Kennedy agreed with his budget director and believed that too much
time was being spent on the precursory Mercury and Gemini programs, as well as time and
money being utilized for scientific development. The president expressed his real feelings about
the space program plainly:
Now this may not change anything about that schedule, but at least we ought to
be clear, otherwise we shouldn’t be spending this kind of money because I’m
not that interested in space. And the second point is the fact that the Soviet
Union has made this a test of the system. So that’s why we’re doing it.23

20
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The president saw the space race with the Russians as a show of strength and did not have a
personal stake in seeing NASA preform the role of scientific discovery and exploration. To
Kennedy, “the system” was an engineering objective of landing on the Moon before the Soviet
Union. Webb assured the president that the manned landing would happen but advised against
cancellations or curtailing science to push funds into Apollo.
Along with President Kennedy letting his private feelings be known to NASA officials,
the space agency’s problems compounded in 1963 when Webb asked the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Science, the body that voted on the budget for NASA, for a 54%
increase in spending.24 This amounted to a $2.012 billion increase, which allowed for a 50%
increase in spending on science. The chairman of the committee, Senator Clinton P. Anderson
(D-NM) felt that the requested increase in budget allocated for science needed investigation and
consultation with prominent scientists in the space fields.25 Philip Abelson, editor of Science
magazine, argued that science would be better served by spending the money allocated for
Apollo on unmanned missions instead.26 Other scientists felt angry that NASA was pulling
young talent from worthwhile research to work on the space program. Non-scientists such as
President Dwight Eisenhower chimed in and stated that he thought the program did not justify
the tax burden and could be invested in domestic programs. Following the complaints of
scientists and others over the way NASA ran its scientific program, the committee did not grant
the full requested increase but, decided to cut it by 10%, mostly in the area of science. NASA
attempted to broaden the agency’s objectives too soon without significant results in areas where
it received money. This is one of the main driving reasons why Mercury, Gemini and early

24
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Apollo were light on science. NASA, in an attempt to shift to a scientific discovery agency too
quickly, risked losing financial backing. The agency retreated to engineering goals that could
have more positive press and prestige than pursuing science-based objectives. Administrative
changes in 1963 reflected this withdrawal.
Science took another hit in 1963 when the NASA Administrator brought George Mueller
in to reorganize and run certain offices in NASA. The administrator hired Mueller to oversee
NASA’s three field centers: Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), and the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC).27 He brought all three field centers under the
OMSF. Mueller also created the Manned Spaceflight Experiment Board to review all
experiments for manned mission to space. Mueller wanted to ensure scientific experiment
components were compatible with the spacecraft without interfering with mission objectives or
schedules. He created the board to counter disruptions in the production of spacecraft due to
constant changing of experiments and spacecraft specification. By doing so, Mueller wanted the
landing to come first and if experiments could not keep up with spacecraft production schedules,
they would be left behind. Despite the strides scientists made in the planning of missions, they
again would have to take a back seat to engineering challenges and priorities.
Budget setbacks and administrative shakeups aside, Apollo mission plans began to take
shape in 1963. During this year, NASA headquarters and its contractors drafted the “Apollo
Systems Specification Book.”28 The aim of the book was to lay out the technical details,
objectives of the program, and program requirements. Because of the early phase of planning,
many pages, in what became known as the “headquarters bible,” were marked “To Be

27
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Determined.” But one thing stands out in the book: the suggestion that exploration of the moon
was not limited to one single mission.29 Apollo could return for several, undefined missions. In
late 1963 to mid-1964, NASA’s science teams highlighted the five fundamental areas of
scientific research to focus on:
Studies of the Lunar Lithosphere, the solid Moon itself, its chemical and
physical constitution, and the implications this should have for its origins in
history.
Investigation of the gravitational and magnetic fields and forces around the
Moon, including experiments for the possible detection of gravitation waves.
Considerations of particles like solar protons and cosmic radiation, together
with their effect on the lunar gravitational field and magnetosphere.
Establishment of astronomical observatories on the Moon.
Studies of proto-organic matter, including possibilities for exobiology.30

With the direction of scientific objectives hinted at, the teams of scientists at NASA and external
contractors began to design experiments and work with NASA engineers and planners to
implement them on lunar landing missions. The next item NASA worked on to help nurture
science in the space program was to acquire funding from Congress for a laboratory to conduct
experiments on returning astronauts and samples arriving from the lunar surface, but this would
open a new battleground in which NASA had to defend its pursuit of conducting science in
space.
III: NASA’s Fiscal Decline After 1965.

29
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By early 1966, MSC had planned on a $6.5 million facility to house and study samples
returned from the Moon.31 Fears of contamination by unknown diseases that could potentially be
brought back by astronauts led planners to add a quarantine facility to the lab. This meant that
NASA had to ask for an increase to $9.1 million to construct and staff the Lunar Receiving Lab.
However, by 1966 the landscape of NASA’s budget had changed. President Lyndon Johnson had
tightened the nation’s purse strings and devoted more of his budget to domestic reforms and war
in Southeast Asia. NASA was not immune to changes in political dynamics of the nation during
the mid to late 1960s, and later 1970s. When James Webb went before the House Committee on
Science and Aeronautics, there was pushback, and the committee requested further hearings to
discuss the necessity and scope of the lab.32 The OMSF and the Public Health Service provided
testimony as to why the lab was essential. OMSF representatives stated that requirements from
the scientific community—opinions that the subcommittee took seriously when it came to
judging NASA—could be satisfied by the planned lab. The Public Health Service, armed with a
letter of agreement from the Surgeon General, declared the lab necessary to prevent
contamination to the earth by unknown pathogens possibly residing in space or the lunar
surface.33 However, when George Low, MSC’s director and William Lilly, Apollo Control
Director went before the subcommittee, several members had not read the OMSF and PHS’s
reports.34 Congressman Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL) accused NASA of using the lab as a way to
secure funding for future expenditures and scolded the organization for not using existing
facilities.35 NASA officials were unable to convince the subcommittee of the necessity of the lab,
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and appropriations were struck from the 1966 bill. Desperate, NASA created a board to survey
existing facilities.36 The board found that no facility contained the requirements NASA needed.
Officials from NASA returned to the subcommittee with their survey and the requested funds
were added back to the bill, but NASA took a lashing publicly and financially before the ink on
the appropriations bill was dry. Congressman James Fulton (R-PA), who felt back-contamination
was a non-issue, accused the survey team of being predisposed by NASA higher-ups to choose
Houston as the site of the new lab and disputed the centralization of the facility’s proposed
operations. “We simply have no facts on which to build a practical foundation and lab,” he
pronounced.37 Fulton’s objections must have held weight because the House Appropriations
Committee slashed NASA’s construction funds by $26.5 million, which included the new lunar
lab, and the committee told the space agency to keep to the necessary minimum for specialized
facilities. NASA budget problems would not end in 1966. In the appropriations for fiscal year
1967, congress cut its budget by $44 million.38 This signaled a new era of restrained spending for
NASA; space funding falling below $5 billion for the first time since 1963. Things did not
improve for NASA due to a devastating fire that caused the agency to slow its plans and shook
governmental and public confidence in the administration’s operations.

IV: The Fire

While scientific efforts for Apollo were beginning to gain some speed, a disaster put the
entire program on hold and caused NASA officials to become more cautious. The first manned
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Apollo mission after the completion of the Gemini Program was AS-204, known later as Apollo
1. Apollo 1’s objective was to verify and assess the crew/spacecraft operations and performance
of the Apollo Command/Service Module (CSM) while in an orbit that would have lasted 14
days. However, technical issues with the spacecraft plagued NASA. The crew was unhappy, as
were Apollo Project managers. During a test in January 1967, a fire broke out that killed
astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee. An investigation by NASA found major
defects in workmanship and faults in management of the entire space program.39
NASA spent the summer of 1967 fixing problems with its spacecraft and improving
management of the program. The half-year stall of the lunar landing program allowed other areas
to catch up and recover, including science. The Science and Applications Directorate at the MSC
was created to further quell scientists’ remaining accusations and complaints that NASA was not
doing enough to nurture science.40 The directorate’s creation allowed the Lunar Receiving Lab to
be given more priority and autonomy. The Apollo 1 fire allowed NASA to take a step back and
reassess its program.
With the changes to the CM completed in August 1967, planning for the first launch
since the fire culminated in a manned Apollo mission in November of the same year. Apollo 4
was an unmanned “all-up” launch, in which every part (CSM and a dummy LM) went into
orbit.41 Because Apollo 1 would have been the 4th Apollo launch, planners maintained the
naming scheme for the rest of the Apollo program. With the successful mission of Apollo 4,
NASA had returned to the space race and was on its way to the Moon.
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V: Apollo 11 Scientific Planning

Mission planning for the first manned lunar landing began in 1966. In a document
presented at the Apollo Lunar Landing Symposium held at MSC, NASA outlined design
priorities for the first landing. Science, however, was not included in NASA’s list of
considerations or priorities.42 Despite it not being openly highlighted, NASA and its science
teams worked on developing as many science experiments as it could in hopes that at least one
would be included on the first flight.43 This approach to planning science continued from the
1961 Webb memo of “ideas first” to justify spending.44 NASA administrators believed if the
ideas were good enough and thoroughly justifiable, they could be included on flights. As flights
took place regularly following the recovery from the fire, scientific activities were limited to
observations and rudimentary medical and biological experiments.45 Training for lunar surface
studies were limited to anything that could be easily done in a bulky pressure suit.
Notwithstanding these limitations, experiments were finally decided upon to accompany
the first landing. In February 1966, NASA planners chose the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment
Package (ALSEP), a group of experiments that astronauts deployed and left on the Moon that
sent data back to earth many years after the landing. One plus of this package that kept its
viability in NASA’s planning was that the experiments included in the package changed and
evolved from mission to mission. (The ALSEP will be further discussed in the following
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chapters.) Regardless of the selection of the experiments package, NASA began to experience
problems in the training of using the package.
In 1967, problems between the astronauts and the experiments began to arise, and NASA
officials were forced back into a debate over how much science should be present on the first
lunar landing. Simulations of astronauts training with the ALSEP and lunar sample gathering
showed that the explorers had problems deploying the experiments in a timely manner.46 NASA
planners had the mission planned down to the minute and any deviation could cost the agency
money or be dangerous to the astronauts themselves. To add to NASA’s list of engineering
problems, batteries to power the experiments added an exorbitant amount of weight to the LM.
This led planners to think about a less complicated scientific package or activity. Finally, in June
1968, George Mueller and George Low organized and oversaw simulations of scientific
instrument deployment so they could evaluate and make recommendations to the mission
planners. Following the demonstration by Astronauts Harrison Schmitt and Don L. Lind, Low
outlined what the priorities for the first extra vehicular activity (EVA) should be:
1: Sample lunar surface
2: Inspect and photo the Lander
3: Gather 1 box of lunar soil
4: Partial ALSEP47
Low also advocated for the elimination of any geological investigation while on the lunar
surface. Mueller and Low brought their recommendations to Sam Phillips, the Apollo Program
director at NASA Headquarters, who discussed the potential changes in mission planning with
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the chairman of the Science and Technology Advisory Committee. They agreed on a new EVA
plan. Instead of a 26 hour stay on the surface with a two-man EVA, the committee concluded a
20 hour stay with a single person EVA of 2-2.5 hours would be sufficient.48 The proposed plan
also eliminated geologic exploration, a television antenna that did not have to be deployed
manually by the astronauts, and all science experiments on the surface. The committee cited that
the new plan increased safety margin for the LM propulsion system, increased the time for
maintenance in case of emergency, simplified the training program for the mission by freeing up
180 hours of training time. The NASA headquarters committee and officials at MSC agreed on
the new plan, except Wilmot Hess, the head of the Science and Applications Directorate at MSC.
Hess protested the new plan and argued that it would not serve lunar science and hurt NASA’s
credibility with scientists.49 He proposed an open-ended EVA lasting up to 3 hours if everything
went well, as well as carrying all science experiments.50 Phillips brought Hess’s contingency
EVA plan to MSC, which approved a compromise between the two new plans: a partial ALSEP,
renamed the Early Apollo Surface Experiments Package (EASEP), photography of lunar
geology, and sample collection by two astronauts. NASA headquarters approved the revised plan
shortly after. Without Hess’s protests, science would have been entirely eliminated from the first
manned lunar landing. This episode also shows the willingness of NASA administrators to keep
discussion of science priorities active. It would have been easier and safer to execute the simpler
plan, but mission planners kept viable the idea of a balanced mission consisting of both science
and engineering.
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In the months prior to the Apollo 11 mission, astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin
“Buzz” Aldrin experienced difficulty in the course of their training for collecting samples and
making geological observations.51 The two astronauts trained for their experiment deployment
and collection portion of the mission on a linoleum floor at the MSC. In a discussion following
their return from the Moon, the two astronauts described this portion of their scientific training as
“useless.”52 After Armstrong complained about his inability to pick up samples or manipulate
tools with his large gloves, engineers treated one of the astronaut’s gloves with silicone. The
treated glove gathered samples better, and headquarters approved the change. However, NASA
scientists objected to the change fretting that the silicone had the potential of contaminating the
samples, but George Low refused to reconsider, and the silicone gloves remained. Armstrong
also expressed concern about collecting quality samples and making scientifically significant
observations while traversing the lunar surface. Armstrong was a test pilot and not a professional
scientist or geologist; he felt underqualified for the scientific portion of the mission. He and
Aldrin shared similar impressions following their flight that the geology field trips to the Grand
Canyon did not help them in their lunar traversals due to “lack of realism,” and, correctly
predicted that future flights would use their information to make more productive geological
surveys.53 MSC geologist Elbert King told the astronauts that anything they described or
collected would be significant because they would be the first people to do it.54 Armstrong and
Aldrin got their chance when they lifted off from KSC on July 16, 1969 and became the first
humans to land on the Moon on July 24th.
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VI: Apollo 11 and Scientific Community Reaction
During their EVA on the lunar surface, Astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin achieved a
series of firsts: first steps on the Moon, first conversation with a world leader on the lunar
surface, first television broadcast from another world, and first lunar samples disturbed by
human hands. Scientists who watched the EVA unfold were pleasantly surprised to find the two
astronauts acting like scientists. The two men debated what type of rocks they found. Armstrong
even left the camera’s vision, a departure from the flight plan, to look at some unusual rocks that
grabbed his attention.55 However, during the bulk sample collection operations, the crew found
that, due to the way the LM had landed, they worked mostly in darkness.56 Mission planners did
not consider the LM would block the sun and cast a large shadow over the work area. The
astronauts grabbed the EASEP from its LM stowage spot and deployed the Lunar Ranging
Retroreflector (LRRR) and the passive seismograph with little difficulty.57 The LRRR consisted
of cubes of silica that reflected laser beams from earth to determine precise Earth-Moon
distances, motion of the Moon’s center of mass, lunar radius, and earth geophysical information.
The passive seismograph measured meteoroid impacts and moonquakes to determine the makeup
of the Moon’s interior. After a short 2 hour and 31 minutes, the crewmen reentered the LM and
mankind’s first scientific exploration of another world was completed. Back on Earth, many in
the scientific community were ecstatic, with one scientist characterizing the result as “instant
science.”58

55

Ibid., 145.
Godwin, Apollo 11, 81.
57
Brooks et al, Chariots for Apollo, 348, 394.
58
Victor Cohn, “Old Moon Game Taunts Players,” Washington Post, September 21, 1969.
56

22

However, not all were impressed or happy with NASA’s scientific efforts following the
first landing. Outrage came about after the naming of Apollo 13 and 14’s crews: not one
scientist-astronaut was selected. To add to scientist’s fears, following Apollo 11, resignations
quickly came from many NASA officials in key scientific positions in the agency and scientists
themselves. Donald U. Wise, deputy in the Lunar Exploration Office, Dr. Elbert King, scientistastronauts F. Curtis Michel, and Wilmot Hess all resigned around August 1969.59 All but Hess
expressed some displeasure with the state of science in the program. Eugene Shoemaker, a strong
advocate of science on Apollo also left and stated that everything the Apollo 11 astronauts
completed could have been done sooner and cheaper by unmanned spacecraft.60 The press
jumped at the chance to air more soundbites by NASA’s disgruntled former scientists. The press
quoted Elbert King as saying, “there’s not enough sympathy with or understanding of scientific
objectives at the higher levels of NASA.”61 Bob Gilruth questioned the nature of the scientistNASA relationships and George Mueller, never one to mince words, cautioned that scientists
were impatient and could not see what was possible.62 Mueller promised “adjustments” to future
mission planning to show NASA’s true commitment to the sciences.
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Chapter 2: Apollo 12, 13 and 14: Transition into Science Based Missions
I: Science Training and Scientist-Astronauts
While the planning for the first manned lunar landing did not involve significant science
training outside the simple tasks Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin and Michael Collins experienced,
NASA realized the subsequent missions required astronauts to transform into scientists. This
new plan to train astronauts, who were usually test-pilots, opened discussion within NASA to a
debate what kind of astronauts should be sent for scientifically heavy missions. The debate
boiled down to NASA having to decide whether to send test pilots trained in science or send
scientists who were trained to fly spacecraft. By 1962, astronauts in the Mercury and Gemini
programs were primarily instructed in meteorology, astronomy, and the physics of earth’s upper
atmosphere with instruction on how to make scientific observations from orbit.1 In the same
year, a NASA working group reviewed astronaut training and concluded it would be easier to
train test pilot astronauts in as much science as possible than to train a scientist-astronaut in
space flight piloting.2 The former group would be “astronaut-observers,” directed by “groundscientists” that instructed the astronauts what to do and what to look for from mission control on
Earth.3 In September 1962, Eugene Shoemaker, a geologist and instructor for the astronauts,
urged MSC to allow him and his team to train the astronauts in geology.4 Max Faget, director of
engineering and development at MSC, wrote a letter to Robert Gilruth and advocated for
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Shoemaker’s idea. With both MSC and scientists backing the idea, Gilruth agreed, and geology
was added to astronaut scientific training schedule. However, some in the scientific community
remained unhappy with what they saw as lack of respect for the importance of science in the
Apollo Program due to the earlier decision to send test pilots instead of scientists to the Moon.
During the 1963 NASA budget hearing in Congress recounted in Chapter 1, Philip Abelson told
the committee that the “already small scientific value of Apollo would be further lessened unless
a scientist went on the landings.”5 As others in the scientific community piled on this opinion,
NASA made strides in 1964 to answer scientists’ concerns surrounding astronaut training and the
question of scientist-astronauts.
NASA used the criticism from the scientific community to make improvements to its
scientific training plans for astronauts who would eventually walk on the Moon. According to an
annual report by President Johnson’s National Aeronautics and Space Council delivered to
Congress, 1964 marked the year that NASA increased emphasis on training in geology,
minerology, and petrology.6 Astronaut training schedule became more comprehensive, including
20-week series [so one 20-week series?] of lectures, briefings, and field trips.7 Instructors guided
astronauts through a one semester college course in land forms, land forming geologic processes,
minerals and their origins, and reading topographic and geologic mapping. NASA sent astronauts
with instructors for geologic training in the Grand Canyon, Big Bend in west Texas, and to the
volcano fields of Arizona and New Mexico. This change in astronaut science preparation
reflected the agency’s new goals of ensuring astronauts be able to investigate and interpret
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terrain and forms that could resemble what they would eventually find traversing the surface of
the Moon. During training for Apollo 14, a scientist reiterated the importance of the astronauts
taking their training seriously as it related to their job on the Moon:
You two could kick off a whole new renaissance of the Moon. It’s our belief
that Cone was carved out of the Moon’s surface more than four billion years
ago. One hell of a meteoric impact. By the way the crater is gouged, there’s
every chance it ripped away rocks from maybe three hundred feet down and
that these rocks were tossed about along the crater rim. If that’s what you bring
back with you, then we’ll be able to study material that came into existence
about the same time the planets and Moons of the solar system were still
forming out of dust and gas, contracting into the worlds we see today
throughout the system. You two will be, in every sense of the word, traveling
back in time. You’ll see what we’re after. No mistake about that.8
Many scientists, like the one quoted above, were frothing at the mouth waiting for results and
samples from the lunar surface. All of NASA’s improvements to astronaut science training in
1964 aimed at maximizing the science-side of the short stay on the Moon. Agency officials thus
hoped to quiet the scientific community’s doubts about the Apollo program. However, there
proved no silencing critics until NASA promised to send a scientist to the Moon.
In October 1964, NASA confused many onlookers with the announcement that the
agency was looking for another batch of astronauts, but no longer required that candidates be test
pilots.9 Behind the scenes, NASA specifically looked for applicants with scientific backgrounds.
Internally, MSC officials and representatives from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) met
in February 1964 to discuss requirements for scientist-astronauts.10 The academy defined
scientist qualifications, and MSC agreed to set physical and psychological requirements. The
NAS mandated that an accepted applicant should have a doctorate in medicine, engineering, or
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natural sciences, specifically geology, and geophysics, and those accepted would be assigned to
the Air Force for one year of flight training. NASA received 1000 suitable applicants and chose
six to be the new crop of scientist-astronauts. Then in 1965, NASA finally unveiled its new
group of astronauts to the public. Every time NASA presented its new class of astronauts, the
press placed a catchy nickname on the group. For the first group was branded “The Mercury
Seven,” then came “The New Nine,” followed by “The Fourteen.” This new group became “The
Scientists.” The Scientists astronaut group included Owen K. Garriott, Edward G. Gibson, Duane
E. Graveline, Joseph P. Kerwin, F. Curtis Michel, and Harrison H. Schmitt.11 Each boasted
impressive credentials in their respective scientific based fields. Garriott held a doctoral degree
in electrical engineering from Stanford University. Gibson earned a Ph.D. in engineering with a
minor in physics from the California Institute of Technology. Duane Graveline specialized in
Aerospace medicine after earning his Doctor of Medicine from University of Vermont College
of Medicine. Joseph Kerwin served as a naval flight surgeon from 1958 following his completion
of a Doctor of Medicine degree from Northwestern Medical School. Curtis Michel graduated
from California Institute of Technology with a degree in physics. Finally, Harrison Schmitt
completed his Ph.D. in Geology in 1964 after attending Harvard University. Only Garriott,
Graveline, Kerwin and Michel had previous military experience before joining NASA in 1965.
With this new group of astronauts, NASA attempted to make good on its promise to bring a
scientist onboard as an active participant on lunar landing missions, but it would be a long road
before any of “The Scientists” would get their chance to fly.
NASA’s changing attitudes toward science became evident throughout the 1960’s
through to the number of internal studies it authorized on the training programs for astronauts. In
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the fall of 1965, the Manned Space Science Study Division commissioned a study that examined
the extent of astronaut training as it pertained to science. The study deemed the training program
again short on science.12 The study’s investigators recommended that more scientist-astronauts
could improve the program by harnessing more resources to train other astronauts. The study
also recommended that scientist-astronauts should be encouraged to keep up their independent
research activity thus remaining active members of the scientific community. This would include
one full day per week of participating in discussions and seminars with one week per month
where scientist-astronauts could leave their astronaut duties to be fully immersed in their
research.13 The recommendations rubbed some of the other astronauts the wrong way. Concerns
that scientist-astronauts could be “part-time” were summed up later by astronaut Eugene Cernan:
[Some] of those guys came in figuring, “I’ll write my textbooks and my thesis
and teach [university courses] and I’ll come by twice a week and be an
astronaut.’ Well, that didn’t work… We are devoting our lives to this whole
thing, and you couldn’t devote anything less, I don’t care what your discipline
was.14
The sentiment was shared by NASA officials who received the report, but nothing came of the
sections recommending increases in the recruitment of scientist-astronauts. NASA officials like
Deke Slayton, head of the astronaut office, believed “No one would benefit from a dead
geologist [and his colleague in the LM] on the Moon.”15 Scientist-astronauts had to prove they
could fly and become competent pilots before being entrusted to go to the Moon. While NASA
officials admitted the science in their programs was lacking, the agency was not yet committed to
have a scientist-astronaut as the primary actor in a mission, e.g., mission commander. Instead, in
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the 1960s, NASA used its scientist-astronauts as tools to bring science training to the level they
wanted, and to win over critics in the scientific community.
II: Apollo 12 – Transition to Lunar Exploration
Apollo 11 showed that NASA and the United States could fly men to the Moon and return them
safely to the Earth. Following the celebrated landing, NASA moved into the next phase of its
Apollo program. Apollo 12 would mark the transition from the lunar landing phase to the lunar
exploration phase of the program.16 According to the president’s report to Congress, the main
feature of this transition was a reduction in launch rate from 2 months to 4-month intervals. The
president’s Space Task Group explained this new gap between missions placed a greater
emphasis on lunar science and to reduce costs. These phases are important to look at because
they show NASA had a plan to ramp up science as more missions were completed. As NASA
became more adept at flying science-based missions, the flights’ parameters became more and
more focused on science. Also, Apollo 12 set out to prove possible a pinpoint landing in a
predetermined landing area. If the crew could succeed at this, the future outlook for scientific
exploration would be greatly enhanced.17 Apollo 11 had trouble at their original landing site due
to large boulders blocking suitable spots to land. Armstrong and Aldrin placed the lander down
where they could and ended up many miles away from their original target. NASA officials
hoped that if Apollo 12 accomplished a precise landing, sites with unique properties for scientific
exploration would open up. Apollo 12’s target was the Surveyor 3 probe that crash-landed on the
lunar surface in April 1967. Commander Charles “Pete” Conrad and Lunar Module Pilot Alan L.
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Bean managed to land 600 feet, walking distance, from the probe.18 They achieved a pinpoint
landing, and scientific exploration of the Moon became more targeted, allowing scientists to
answer specific questions about the lunar surface by choosing where to land. Apollo 12 also
marked the point in the program where science was upgraded to a primary mission objective.19
This was a significant step for science, which previously took a back seat to engineering
objectives. Science was now one of the cornerstones for mission planning and execution.
Planning for Apollo 12 marked the debut of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment
Package (ALSEP). The ALSEP was the full version of the EASEP first flown on Apollo 11,
which allowed more advanced experiments to be carried on each Apollo flight, as well as long
term data gathering once the astronauts departed for the Earth. The complete ALSEP consisted
of eight experiments, five to six of which would be carried per mission, a central station that
served as the data transmission and communication hub, and a SNAP-27 Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generator that provided power to the experiments and central station.20 The
nature of the ALSEP’s customizability allowed scientists and mission planners to pick and
choose experiments differently for each mission depending on the particular scientific goals.
Apollo 12’s ALSEP contained six experiments for its maiden voyage to the Moon. A Passive
Seismometer Experiment (PSE) detected “Moonquakes” to study the lunar subsurface
structure.21 The Lunar Surface Magnetometer (LSM) measured the Moon’s magnetic field to
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determine the electrical properties of the subsurface and the interaction between solar plasma and
the lunar surface.22 The Solar Wind Spectrometer (SWS) studied the solar wind and its effect on
the environment of Moon’s exterior.23 NASA scientists designed the Suprathermal Ion Detector
Experiment (SIDE) to measure the properties of positive ions present in the lunar environment.
The experiment worked with the LSM to provide data on plasma interaction and to determine
electric potential of the surface of the Moon. Coupled with the SIDE, the Cold Cathode Ion
Gauge (CCIG) measured the presence of the lunar atmosphere.24 Finally the Lunar Dust Detector
(LDD) measured lunar dust accumulation and was expanded to include particle, radiation and
temperature studies on Apollo 14 and 15.25 All of the experiments contributed to knowledge of
the Earth and the Moon by determining the state and structure of lunar interior, composition of
the lunar surface, the processes that modified it, and the evolutionary sequences that led to the
Moon’s composition.26
However, going to the Moon to recover Surveyor 3 and set up the ALSEP would not be
the Apollo 12 astronauts’ only job. While on the surface, astronauts Conrad and Bean
participated in two EVAs that lasted three and a half hours each, almost twice the total time
Aldrin and Armstrong spent traversing the lunar surface. While astronauts spent the first EVA
unloading and deploying the ALSEP, the second EVA consisted of the astronauts completing a
lunar field geology experiment.27 With real time geology advisors from Earth communicating
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directly through headsets worn by the astronauts, Conrad, and Bean documented samples,
collected a deep core sample using a specialized hand drill, and dug a trench to document the
erosion effects of the lunar surface.
In lunar orbit, Command Module Pilot Richard F. Gordon, Jr. had plenty to keep him
busy as well. Alongside photographing of future Apollo landing sites, he took multispectral
photographs of the lunar surface that allowed scientists to see variation for geologic mapping and
study its reflective nature, and correlate photographs with returned samples.28 Between
experiments, the astronauts on the surface also took photos with a camera more advanced than
those brought on Apollo 11, as well as attempted to set up a color television camera to broadcast
high quality pictures. However, a mistake by astronaut Bean, who pointed the camera directly at
the sun, destroyed a tube in the camera.29 Despite this, Apollo 12’s lunar surface and lunar orbit
stay was a massive scientific success; reams of data poured in from the experiments operating on
the Moon. One highlight that excited scientists was that the PSE recorded astronaut footfalls in
real time as well. It recorded the commander rolling a grapefruit-sized rock down the wall of a
crater.30 Apollo 12 proved that the science could be collected in space, and experiments could
gather data from a celestial body a quarter of a million miles away.
III: Apollo 13 – Successful Failure
The third manned Moon landing, in 1970, aimed to be the most ambitious one yet. NASA
was getting the hang of sending men to the Moon, and the public was beginning to see the
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spectacle as routine. The mission planned to include two, four-hour long EVAs with an option to
be extended to five hours each depending on astronaut condition and number of remaining
consumables.31 Apollo 13’s ALSEP contained new instruments not flown on previous missions.
The mission planned to deploy a PSE, which would become the second in a 3-point coverage net
for seismometers, along with the PSE from Apollo 12 and eventual placement of a device on
Apollo 14.32 The Charged Particle Lunar Environment Experiment (CPLEE) aimed to measure
the particle energies of protons and electron that reached the lunar surface from the Sun.33 The
Lunar Atmosphere Detector (LAD), also called the Cold Cathode Gauge Experiment (CCGE),
amounted to a standalone version of Apollo 12’s CCIG.34 This experiment was never flown in an
ALSEP configuration following this mission. Apollo 13’s ALSEP also contained the Heat Flow
Experiment (HFE) that tracked thermal measurements of the Moon’s subsurface to determine the
rate at which heat flowed out of the Moon.35 This experiment promised to give scientists a better
understanding of the thermal evolution of the Moon. These experiments, in conjunction with
Apollo 12’s ALSEP, could provide answers to questions about the Moon’s physiology,
evolution, and relationship to the Earth.
Apollo 13 mission planners also packed the EVAs with lunar surface activities not
pertaining to ALSEP deployment. Two contingency samples of 2 pounds of materials were
planned at the commencement of each EVA.36 Planners prepared for 95 pounds of representative
lunar materials, including core samples and fragments from the Fra Mauro Hills, the planned
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landing spot for Apollo 13 lunar astronauts James Lovell and Fred Haise. The astronauts would
perform geological surveys and take photography of small geological features that could not
survive transportation.
While his colleagues explored the lunar surface, Jack Swigert was to conduct
photographic studies from orbit as well as to investigate and document how water flowed in
space following a water dump from the service module.37 The command module pilot was also
instructed to perform an experiment while in orbit: VHF Bistatic Radar Experiment. This
experiment consisted of reflecting a VHF signal off the lunar surface back to an antenna on
Earth.38 By conducting this experiment, scientists could have used the data to determine the
depth of lunar regolith layers, the soil that covers the solid rock on the surface of the Moon.
However, all the mission planning for Apollo 13 proved for naught due to an explosion in
the spacecraft’s oxygen tank 56 hours into the flight. All the systems in the command and service
module had to be shut down to conserve power for the crew’s return and the lunar module had to
be used as a lifeboat. The astronauts powered the LM to the lowest levels possible to keep life
support and communications operational during the return to Earth. At that point, the farthest
thing from any person’s mind at NASA was conducting science. However, routine procedures
prior to Apollo 13’s accident allowed for some science. Apollo 13 was the first time NASA
began the established procedure of intentionally crashing the third stage of the Saturn V rocket,
the S-IVB, into the lunar surface and measuring its effect on ALSEP instruments. When Apollo
13’s S-IVB impacted the lunar surface, Apollo 12’s PSE picked up the Moonquake.39 Apollo
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12’s SIDE recorded a spike in ion counts after impact due to the increased temperatures and
particles from impact were ejected 60 kilometers off the lunar surface and were ionized by
sunlight.40 Despite the “successful failure” of Apollo 13, the next Apollo program inherited
many of the ideas for the mission
IV: Apollo 14 – Extending the Stay with New Tools
Despite Apollo 14 inheriting Apollo 13’s mission objectives and landing site, NASA
mission planners utilized the time allotted for the investigation of the accident to make Apollo 14
the most scientifically saturated mission to the Moon yet. This task was accomplished in part by
increasing the time traversing the surface and changing the way astronauts transported and
worked with samples while preforming their scientific tasks.
NASA mission planners maneuvered to keep Commander Alan B. Shepard, an original
Mercury astronaut, and Lunar Module Pilot Edgar Mitchell on the lunar surface for a maximum
of 35 hours, a full 15 hours longer than Apollo 11 stayed and 5 hours longer than Apollo 12.41
EVAs for the two men were planned to be 4 and a half hours each with an increase to 5 hours
allowed if the astronauts were physically up to the change. Due to this increased time on the
surface of the Moon, NASA engineers developed a new piece of technology to aid the astronauts
in equipment transportation and sample collection. The Modularized Equipment Transporter
(MET) was a two-wheeled table used to hold cameras, science equipment and collected samples
while working on the Moon.42 The MET also highlighted the expanded partnership between
NASA’s engineering and science offices. No longer was the engineering side the primary focus,
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both offices worked together on projects to ensure the success of mission goals. Astronauts were
now no longer hindered by how many samples they could carry on their person. Due to the
appearance of how the astronauts used the MET, the cart earned the nickname “the rickshaw,
wheelbarrow and caddy cart.”43 Apollo 14 astronauts had the tools to stay on the surface longer
and maximize the scientific potential of going to the Moon.
NASA scientists and planners customized the ALSEP for Apollo 14 to take advantage of
the unique surface characteristics of the Fra Mauro Highlands. Along with a PSE, designers
equipped the ALSEP with an Active Seismic Experiment (ASE) that consisted of 21 pyrotechnic
“thumpers” and mortars.44 The thumpers were charges that the crew laid down and detonated at
15-foot intervals in order to get a reading and data from the PSE. Like smashing a S-IVB into the
surface, the thumpers would give scientists data on the Moon’s subsurface structures. The crew
deployed a mortar component of the ASE that contained four rocket projectiles that would be
directed by mission control to launch and impact the surface once the crew left for Earth.45
Along with a CPLEE originally flown on Apollo 13, the Apollo 14 ALSEP also carried a version
of Apollo 11’s LRRR.46 Aside from the new experiments, the ALSEP also included the SIDE
and CCIG experiments as well as a standalone version of the Solar Wind Composition
Experiment.47 Launched in February, 1971, Apollo 14’s ALSEP took what worked on previous
missions and added some novel experiments that explored the unique environment of its landing
site.
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Once the ALSEP was set up and activated, Apollo 14 astronauts had other experiments to
attend to while exploring the Fra Mauro Highlands. While they worked and moved about the
surface, the astronauts deployed a Lunar Portable Magnetometer (LPM) on the MET to measure
variation in the Moon’s magnetic field.48 As on the Apollo 12 mission, astronauts dug a trench to
test how lunar soil moved. This time, the crew completed the experiment to gather data on
designs for future lunar vehicles and development for lunar shelters.49
The astronauts also participated in less serious experiments. Before the crew left the
surface, Commander Shepard made a makeshift golf club by connecting a six-iron head to the
handle of the sample extractor tool.50 Shepard then revealed two gold balls and took several onehanded swings, but due to the bulky space suit he missed several times. When he finally
connected, he exclaimed they went “miles and miles and miles” in the low lunar gravity.
Mitchell also threw one of his lunar sample scoops like a javelin.
While his fellow astronauts were on the surface having the time of their lives, Command
Module Pilot Stuart Roosa worked hard on his orbital science objectives. Roosa spent much of
his time photographing candidate sites for future missions and observing his crew member’s
work on the surface. Roosa also had to complete the bistatic radar experiment originally planned
for Apollo 13 and a s-band transponder test designed to pick up variation in lunar gravity.51
When the surface crew rejoined their colleague in orbit, the astronauts completed several zerogravity in-flight demonstrations for television cameras in the spacecraft. The crew test
electrophoretic separation in zero-g by testing red and blue dyes, hemoglobin, and DNA to see if
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preparation of materials in space could lead to the development of engineering ideas to make
new vaccines on space stations.52 The astronauts also tested heat transfer in weightless liquids
and gases such as water, a sugar solution and carbon-dioxide gas. Following these in-flight
demos, Shepard reflected on the usefulness of doing these experiments and the value of the space
program:
If, for example, these manufacturing processes turned out to be better in the
space environment, or the vaccines, which are proposed to be developed on a
weightless condition can be used effectively, then this type of operation in
Skylab can become immediately beneficial to the people of the United States
and the world.
He spoke to the detractors who accused the space program of wasting money and providing no
benefit. He saw a paradigm shift that Kuhn theorized. A shift from normal science before the
lunar landings to this “extraordinary science” being done. Shepard, who had seen the program
from the beginning, knew the value of manned space flight as it pertained to science. Kuhn’s
theory about conflicting ideas leading to a shift in scientific discovery is evident in the space
program’s trajectory.
Apollo 14’s mission revealed interesting data for scientists on Earth. When Apollo 14’s
S-IVB impacted the Moon, it was the first time the full network of PSEs recorded an event.53
Upon return to Earth, scientists within NASA studied Apollo 14’s command module windows to
find information about the size and distribution of small micrometeoroid impacts.54 Not all
experiments went smoothly though. The ASE encountered many problems with the thumpers. Of
the 21 thumpers deployed, 5 did not fire when commanded.55 Due to the failed thumpers and
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concern over the deployment of the mortar, mission control never fired the four rockets.56 There
were attempts to fire them in 1975, but the long dormancy caused the charges to fail.57 NASA’s
planned it next forays to the Moon to be longer and more exciting from a scientific standpoint,
especially with the inclusion of a new vehicle.
V: Life Science Reorganization
While NASA remained on track to rack up successful missions following the
investigation into Apollo 13’s accident, agency officials decided to look inward at its scientific
program. In the spring of 1970, NASA asked the Space Science Board of the National Academy
of Science to review the agency’s life science program.58 Following the inquiry and examination,
the board recommended that if the agency combined several life sciences disciplines under a
single office, they would become more effective.
As seen in Chapter 1 where engineering and science departments came under oversight of
one office to facilitate communication and cooperation, NASA took the board’s recommendation
and created the NASA Director for Life Science position which oversaw the new NASA Life
Science Office under the OMSF. The NASA Life Science Office included scientists who worked
in the disciplines of biology, medicine, man-machine cooperation, human factors, and life
support/protective systems. One of the first things the new office worked on was a new flight
crew health stabilization program following Apollo 13’s pre-flight exposure to measles-rubella.59
The program kept crews in the process of training away from exposure from viruses and diseases
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that could manifest in space.60 In April 1971, the office discontinued the quarantine process for
crews returning from the Moon.61 Life science office researchers, by examining lunar samples,
discovered the Moon was basically sterile with no hazard of back-contamination present. In
1972, the life sciences team headed up development of new lightweight, comfortable space suits
for shuttle missions for long term use during missions.62 By championing and pursuing its
commitment to science, NASA created an office for scientific disciplines to work together and
affect change on the space program.
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Chapter 3: Apollo 15, 16 and 17: Squeezing the Most Science Out of the Apollo Sponge
I: Budget Problems Eliminate Late Lunar Missions
1970 proved a rollercoaster of a year for NASA and its scientific exploration of Earth’s
Moon. The agency returned from near disaster following Apollo 13’s accident with more
scientifically heavy missions, and it prepared to go further with extended stay missions.
However, the year ended on a down note when, due to the waning of public interest and shifting
priorities in the US government, NASA announced cuts to several missions and a shift in focus
going forward. A report the Bureau of the Budget prepared for President Richard M. Nixon, then
just assuming office, signaled shifting winds for NASA. “Priorities of national interests have
shifted, and this put space lower on the list. This caused less funding to be put aside for NASA
and therefore less ability to perform missions,” concluded the report.1 Despite successful
missions to the Moon, NASA scientists could not escape power politics. They were not free to
tinker in their labs, sheltered from the greater Cold War occurring outside their offices and labs.
Unmanned systems were less expensive for missions involving data collection, announced the
report, and therefore should be the agency’s new focus.2 Finally, the Bureau of the Budget asked
the question that was on the minds of many public and government officials following the first
landing: why do we continue with manned missions?
Reasons for proceeding other than competition include enhancing
the national prestige, advancing the general technology, or simply
faith that manned space flight will ultimately return benefits to
mankind in ways now unknown and unforeseen. None of these
secondary arguments can be quantified and are most difficult to
support.3
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NASA was unable to sway the new administration into continued funding manned exploration of
the Moon. Because the new Republican executive administration and Republican-controlled
congress looked to cut some spending from the national budget, NASA recast plans for the
remainder of Apollo and beyond.
On January 4, 1970, George Low canceled Apollo 20.4 The remaining 7 missions (Apollo
13-17) would be stretched out to 1974, with 4 missions planned to fly in 1970-1971. Low
announced the Apollo Applications Program, soon to be known as Skylab, would be flown
before the final 3 lunar landings. Ten days later, Administrator Paine, following preliminary
budget discussions, announced that Saturn V production would be suspended following the
completion of the 15th booster. NASA allocated the final booster for Skylab. This second
announcement also ended all talk of a Mars mission, because NASA no longer had a long-range
heavy lift vehicle in development.
The final nail in the coffin of the Apollo program came in September 1970, following the
decision to make significant cutbacks to save for future missions. Administrator Paine called a
press conference to formally announce NASA’s operating plan for fiscal 1971. Apollo 15-19
were cancelled, and the remaining missions were redesignated 14-17 and planned to occur at sixmonth intervals.5 Following the completion of Apollo 17, three Skylab missions would be flown.
Paine did not say it in so many words, but according to the 1970 President’s Report on Space
Activities, NASA expected the Apollo program to be completed by 1972.6
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Paine’s final announcement drew many critics.7 An editorial in the New York Times,
which long had been opposed to NASA’s prominence in the budget and the government, was
scathing and called into question the agency’s priorities for Apollo. “The budget’s myopia which
forced this… decision can only vindicate the critics who have insisted Apollo was motivated by
purely prestige considerations, not scientific goals.”8 Lunar scientists became vocal about the
decisions for cutbacks because many university scientists lost funding in the new fiscal plan.
Harold Urey, a renowned chemist interested in lunar science following Apollo 11 wrote a piece
for the Washington Post that highlighted much of the reaction from the scientific community:
It cost us… one half of one percent of our gross production… Now
we wish to finish a job which has been beautifully began. And we
get stingy. Because of an additional cost of about 20 cents per year
for each of us we drop two flights to the Moon recommended by
scientific committees composed of men who personally profit from
the expenditure little or not at all. How foolish and short sighted
from the view of history can we be?9
One common idea was prevalent in everyone’s criticisms of the budgetary decision: the
remaining missions must maximize scientific potential. This became the mantra for the
remainder of Project Apollo. Despite the way it came about, the budget crisis forced NASA to
put its best scientific foot forward and brought the agency in step with its true goal: scientific
exploration of the Moon. NASA’s strategy for manned lunar missions now placed science fully
in the driver’s seat. Science objectives dictated many aspects of mission planning.
II: Apollo 15: Apollo Enters Its Final Phase
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As Apollo 12 marked a new phase for exploration of the Moon by NASA, Apollo 15
ushered in the final phase of men walking on the Moon in the 1970s. The highlights of this new
phase, named the Apollo “J” missions, included longer stays on the Moon, enhanced mobility
while on the lunar surface, and increased the amount of lunar and orbital science completed in
the duration of each mission.10 Apollo 15 mission planners allotted for a 67 hour stay on the
lunar surface, double the length of time spent on the lunar surface by Apollo 14.11 This increase
in the time promised to be even more productive with the introduction of the Lunar Roving
Vehicle. (LRV)
On August 4th, 1969, Bob Seamans wrote to Vice President Spiro Agnew arguing that
Apollo astronauts needed additional mobility to traverse the Moon more effectively.12 NASA
contractors submitted designs, and Boeing won the contract to develop the new vehicle. The
agency contracted Boeing to build 4 LRVs beginning in October 1969, but due to the budget
cuts, only three were ultimately built. Between October 1969 and the Apollo 15 mission in
August 1971, Boeing completed over 70 operational tests on the vehicle to make sure it was
ready for its maiden voyage.13 The LRV could operate for 78 hours per mission and driven in a
radius of 6 miles from the LM in the event it stopped working.14 This mission rule was put in
place, so astronauts would not become stranded and would always be in walking distance for the
lander. To transport the rover to the Moon, the LRV folded up tight to fit in quad 1 of the LM
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and was easily removed and set up by astronauts once on the lunar surface.15 The rover also
carried experiments on its platform. With the LRV, astronauts could travel farther from the LM
and conduct science without being restrained by what previously was not feasible, and mission
planners set loftier goals for scientific observation, experimentation, and discovery.
Mission planners chose the landing site for Apollo 15 based on its diverse terrain types
and landscapes bundled together in a close area. The Apennine/Hadley area consisted of five
distinct types of landforms.16 An examination of the Apennine Mountain range could yield a
collection of material ejected from the nearby Antolyen Craters. Scientists wanted samples from
Hadley Rille to determine the origin of the rille itself. The Palus Putiedinis also intrigued
scientists because it was a flat surface on the Moon, was younger than Apollo 11’s landing site,
and could shed light on recent Earth-Moon history. Finally, five kilometers north of Apollo 15’s
landing site sat large craters and hills made of volcanic domes. The cornucopia of land types
around the Apollo 15 astronauts assured that scientific yield would be at a new high and had the
potential of keeping scientists busy tabulating data for years.
Apollo 15’s surface crew carried the most advanced scientific equipment the Apollo
program had seen thus far. The crew’s ALSEP boasted 7 experiments: PSE, SWS, SIDE, HFE,
CCIG, LDP and a Lunar Surface Magnetometer, a new experiment in the program. The Lunar
Surface Magnetometer (LSM) measured the Moon’s magnetic field and detected fluctuation
within the field.17 In many ways, the astronauts on the lunar surface went back to basics. The
astronauts preformed a stand-up EVA when they first arrived on the Moon. This comprised of an
astronaut using the upper hatch of the LM to describe his first impressions of the surrounding
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landscape of the landing site.18 This was an important addition to procedure because it gave
scientists an idea of a detailed map due to orbital cameras only being able to have a resolution up
to 20 meters.19 The scientists and mission planners could only make a rough estimation of the
terrain and features surrounding the landing site. The stand-up EVA would give a better picture
and help mission planners cross off or add objectives based on what the astronauts saw around
them. Following the stand-up EVA, the astronauts took time to sleep to be ready for the rest of
the EVAS on the lunar surface, which like previous missions included ALSEP deployment,
geological traverse, deep core samples, and a soil mechanics experiment as well as using the new
LRV to go further and longer during EVAs.20
In orbit, the command module also contained new experiments that became standard for
remining Apollo missions. Many of the new orbital experiments aimed at giving a full map of
the lunar surface not previously seen. A Gamma Ray Spectrometer contained an extendable
bloom that conducted x-ray and alpha-ray experiments on the light and dark sides of the Moon.21
The X-Ray Fluorescence Experiment measured spikes in the x-ray levels caused by solar x-ray
interactions with the surface of the Moon. The final new mapping experiment was an Alpha
Particle Spectrometer. This experiment mapped the surface by looking at mono-electric alpha
particles emitted from the surface. Orbital science duties also contained experiments completed
on earlier flights including UV photography, Gegenschein Experiment, Bistatic Radar, and
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Composite Casting Experiment.22 The creation of the Scientific Instrument Module (SIM) on the
CSM, allowed NASA space to store a metric and panoramic camera.23 These cameras, when
deployed, photographed the entire visible surface of the Moon from orbit. Recovery of the film
also posed a challenge with cameras located outside of the command module. This required, an
astronaut to conduct an EVA outside the craft during the return flight to Earth to recover the
film. With more expansive experiments added to Apollo, NASA constantly searched for new
procedures to maximize the scientific potential of the equipment and astronauts it sent to the
Moon.
One change the CSM experienced was inclusion of a subsatellite released in orbit that
contained 3 experiments, much like an ALSEP in orbit. The SIM continued to send data from
orbit long after the astronauts returned to Earth.24 The SIM’s S-Band Transponder Experiment
found data on the lunar gravity field from orbit. The Particle Shadows and Boundary Layer
Experiments gathered information on the formation of earth’s magnetosphere, interactions of
plasmas with the Moon and physics of solar flares. The final SIM experiment, the Biaxial
Fluxgate Magnetometer, helped scientists characterize the physical and electrical properties of
the Moon.
Following the crew’s return from the Moon, NASA scientists conducted experiments on
the astronauts and spacecraft. As on Apollo 14, NASA scientists and engineers completed the
Apollo Window Meteoroid Experiment.25 The astronauts were subjected to total body
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spectrometry.26 NASA scientist and medical personnel completed tests to detect changes in total
body potassium, muscle mass and radiation in astronauts returning from the Moon. This
experiment’s designers hoped to shed light on the toll that long duration spaceflight took on the
human body. The data from this experiment would impact future missions such as Skylab where
astronauts would stay in space much longer in zero-gravity than a duration of a flight to the
Moon.
Scientists around the world had an overwhelmingly positive reaction due to Apollo 15.
This was mostly due in part to the discovery of a sample returned from the Moon that was named
the “Apollo 15 Genesis Rock.”27 After being analyzed, scientists discovered the sample
contained a piece of the original lunar crust formed shortly after the creation of the Moon. The
genesis rock appeared the oldest rock returned on any Apollo mission. Scientists dated it to be
4.15 billion years or older. Along with the Genesis Rock, Apollo 15 returned a deep core sample
that contained a record of the last billion years of the Sun’s activity. Many commented on the
abilities of the astronauts. Larry A. Haskin, vice chairman of the Lunar Sample Analysis
Planning Team wrote to Bob Gilruth that “We felt comfortable and confident that the scientific
aspects of the mission were in competent hands.”28 Scientists had much to be excited about with
Apollo 15’s work and the outlook on the final 2 Apollo missions.
III: Apollo 16: Peak of Orbital Science
Many of the previous Apollo missions had explored the darker areas of the Moon,
thought to be once part of the ancient lunar sea. NASA’s penultimate mission to the Moon, in
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April 1972, aimed to land in the Moon’s southern highlands, known as the Descartes Highlands.
Scientists thought these lighter areas of the Moon to be higher than the ancient lunar seas and to
contain rock that covered 11.5% of the lunar surface.29 NASA mission planners and scientists
hoped recovery of samples from the Descartes Highlands would yield material that could
represent more of the lunar surface than Apollo astronauts could cover. NASA mission planners
knew they were running out of missions to the Moon and wanted to get as much material that
represented as much of the Moon as possible.
One problem NASA astronauts on previous missions encountered was the disintegration
of samples during recovery and return to earth. Sampling bags damaged lunar samples. Scientists
complained that the outer 1/100th of an inch was valuable to study the radiation history of a
sample and the existing sample bags wore that layer away. NASA engineers developed a new
sampling bag with a padded interior to help protect thinner rocks.30 The new bags were another
way to maximize science potential as much as possible in the face of the end of the Apollo
manned landing program.
Apollo 16’s ALSEP contained a mix of experiments that had become standard and
experiments that had not been flown since early Apollo missions. The PSE, LSM, and HFE were
once again deployed. NASA scientists also sent an Active Seismic Experiment with Apollo 16
after the first unsuccessful attempt to fully deploy it on Apollo 14.31 However, because the
ASE’s pitch sensor malfunctioned following the firing of three sets of explosives, the fourth set
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never fired.32 Of the twenty-two thumper charges, nineteen were fired on Apollo 16. NASA tried
this experiment once more on Apollo 17.
More problems plagued Apollo 16’s ALSEP package. During set-up of the second of the
ALSEP’s HFE probes, the cable snagged around Commander John Young’s boot and separated
the probe from the central station.33 NASA technicians and astronauts felt a fix was feasible, but
mission control decided the time-consuming repairs would be better used on other work. Mission
control also feared the danger to other ALSEP experiments was too high to attempt to repair the
HFE. While NASA grew adept at sending men to the Moon, no mission was perfectly executed
because, as in scientific investigation and testing, human error always remained present.
Along with other surface experiments carried over from earlier missions such as the
Portable Magnetometer, Solar Wind Composition Experiment, and conducting an investigation
of surrounding lunar geology, Apollo 16 astronauts had new scientific equipment to deploy in
the Descartes region.34 The Soil Mechanics Device consisted of a penetrometer, a tool to test the
strength of a material, specifically designed for lunar soil. When the astronauts forced the
penetrometer core into the ground, it measured characteristics and mechanical properties of the
lunar soil.35 This experiment amounted to a more advanced version of the soil mechanics
experiment from earlier Apollo missions. An experiment unique to Apollo 16, the Cosmic Ray
Detector mounted on the LM’s decent stage, measured changes in the mass and energy of cosmic
rays and solar wind particles.36 Astronauts completed the EVA’s and removed the device from
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the exterior of the LM and returned it to Earth for analysis. The final new experiment had been
previously done on the orbital side of Apollo missions. The astronauts set up a far ultraviolet
camera and spectroscope at various points during their EVAs.37 They pointed the camera at
astrological objects such as star clouds, nebulae, galaxy clusters, intergalactic hydrogen, solar
bow clouds, solar wind, and the atmospheres of the Moon and Earth. Upon completion of the
EVAs, the astronauts removed the film cassette and returned it to Earth for scientists to pour over
the negatives. Apollo 16’s lunar surface science objectives offered a mix of old and new and
showed NASA as willing to entertain new experiment ideas despite the mission being the
penultimate flight for its lunar exploration program.
In terms of tracking NASA’s commitment to science during the Apollo era, Apollo 16
orbital science objectives and experiments reflected a significantly greater commitment than on
earlier Apollo missions. Of all the trips to the Moon done under the banner of Apollo, 16’s
mission holds the record for most done during the orbital portion of the mission.38 While in orbit
of the Moon, Command Module Pilot Ken Mattingly conducted the Laser Altimeter, S-Band
Transponder Experiment, Gamma-Ray Spectrometer, Alpha-Particle Spectrometer, Orbital Mass
Spectrometer, X-Ray Fluorescence Spectrometer, Bistatic Radar, used the metric and panoramic
cameras, and deployed the subsatellite.39
During the flight from Earth to Moon, orbit around the Moon and return to the earth, the
crew completed several experiments to investigate the characteristics of a space environment.
Astronauts tested the response of microbes by measuring the effects of reduced oxygen pressure,

37

Ibid., 41.
Ibid., 49.
39
Simmons, On the Moon with Apollo 16, 7; NASA, “Apollo 16 Press Kit,” in Apollo 16: The NASA Mission Reports,,
50-56.
38

51

vacuum zero-g, and ultraviolet irradiation on five strands of bacterial fungi and viruses.40 The
new Visual Light Flash Phenomenon Experiment had its roots in previous Apollo missions but
was not realized until Apollo 16. During rest periods on previous missions, crewman reported
that flashes of light penetrating their closed eyes.41 On Apollo 16, planners set two rest periods
aside to conduct the experiment. During these periods, two of the three astronauts wore eye
shields, while the third wore the Apollo Light Flash Moving Emulsion Detector to measure the
cosmic rays thought to cause the light flashes. The detector’s plate would then be analyzed by
scientists on earth post-flight. The astronauts also completed the Biostack Experiment which
studied the effects of cosmic radiation on biomaterial.42 The experiment composed of exposing
material to high energy ions present in cosmic radiation. Scientists studied the results of this
experiment because they hoped it would give an indication of how ions could pose a threat to
man during long duration flights. In preparation for the Skylab flights, NASA also had Apollo 16
astronauts conduct operational tests and experiments on items that would be used in the
upcoming space laboratory.43 They tested food packages, the improved gas/water separator, and
fecal collection bags. These results would help prepare NASA for its next stage of manned
spaceflight.
On return to Earth, the astronaut’s scientific tests continued. NASA scientists and
medical personnel subjected them to a Bone Mineral Measurement Experiment that examined
changes in human bone density due to changes in gravity impacting the human body.44 The CM
had the Window Meteoroid Experiment conducted on it to measure the effect of
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micrometeoroids.45 Finally, a special Moon rock was tested that underwent a unique voyage. A
rock recovered from an earlier Apollo landing had its natural magnetism removed by NASA’s
team of scientists and was sent with the Apollo 16 astronauts back to the Moon.46 The crew
carried the rock on the voyage back and returned to Earth once again to see if the magnetism had
returned during the course of its journey. NASA’s penultimate flight squeezed every opportunity
to conduct science throughout its mission.
Apollo 16 easily counted as a scientific success due to the number of experiments
conducted and data received. During the three EVAs, the surface astronauts traveled 27
kilometers across the Descartes highlands and collected 213 pounds of representative material.47
Data from experiments allowed scientists to build upon knowledge gained from previous
missions and plan for Apollo’s final landing.
IV: Apollo 17: NASA’s Manned Landing Swan Song
In many ways, Apollo 17 in late 1972 culminated the work and perseverance of NASA
scientists. One of the most notable achievements scientists earned on the final Moon landing was
the opportunity of sending one of their own on the voyage. NASA selected geologist Harrison
Schmitt as the Lunar Module Pilot on Apollo 17. While serving as an astronaut at NASA since
1965, he instructed Apollo on lunar navigation, geology, and feature recognition.48 He also
aggressively advocated integration of scientific activists in the lunar landing program. Someone
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who was a scientist first and astronaut second finally reached the Moon, only one of many firsts
for the final landing on the Moon.
Mission planners and NASA science personnel long debated Apollo 17’s landing site.
The area of the Moon that finally won out was the Taurus-Littrow Mountain/Crater Range.49
This area had the advantage of the presence of lunar highland material, the hills processed
characteristic of volcanic structures, and the site had minimal overlap with Apollo 15 and 16 to
maximize samples and data. To further prevent repetition in date collection, NASA Science and
Applications Directorate allowed the Apollo 17 crew to see samples from previous missions and
discuss what they should look for.50 However, due to the unknowns about the landing site and
surrounding area, scientists instructed the astronauts to “use their heads.”51
As NASA’s final trip to the lunar surface, Apollo 17’s experiments included all new
experiments developed for the cancelled Apollo 18 and 19 lunar flights.52 The only returning
equipment was the Heat Flow Experiment.53 The first new ALSEP experiment was the Lunar
Ejecta and Meteorites Experiment (LEAM).54 This device measured the physical properties of
primary and secondary particles that impacted the lunar surface. Designers fashioned together
detector plates that tracked the pressure of the particles. The second ALSEP experiment was the
Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment.55 (LSPE) This investigation replaced the PSE and ASE and
brought the two experiments together in one package. After the crew left the surface, the
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explosive charge would detonate, and the experiment would transition into a PSE state until the
remnants of the LM impacted the surface, at which point the device would be deactivated. The
third ALSEP experiment was the Lunar Atmospheric Composition Experiment. (LACE), which
studied measured components in the ambient lunar atmosphere.56 The experiment sought to
confirm the existence of gravity waves as predicted by Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, as well as
to gain insight into the Moon’s interior structure.57 However, due to a design error, the
experiment proved unable to detect the waves scientist sought to corroborate. The ALSEP was
not the only part of Apollo 17 mission to conduct new experiments.
Apollo 17 astronauts brought newer scientific hardware with them, outside of the ALSEP
experiments, and these were tested during the course of their lunar exploration of Taurus—
Littrow. The Traversal Gravimeter sat mounted on the LRV and traced the gravitation properties
of the landing site and remote locations along the geologic travel route.58 The scientists back on
earth used this data to compare geologically similar areas of the earth-lunar relationship and
shared history-struggling a bit to follow this. The Surface Electrical Properties Experiment
consisted of a transmitter placed 100 meters from the LM and a receiving antenna mounted to the
LRV.59 By sending and receiving signals between the transmitter and receiver, scientists
measured the electromagnetic energy transmission, absorption, and reflective characteristics of
the lunar surface and subsurface. The final lunar surface experiment was a Lunar Neutron
Probe.60 This test consisted of a probe inserted into the core sample hole in order to measure
neutron flux on the top two meters of the lunar soil. Researchers compared the probe’s data to
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isotopes in the core sample upon return to earth. As astronauts left the surface of the Moon for
the final time, they conducted one final experiment, one technically continuing today. The crew
left their science instruments and tools on the Moon from Apollo 17 and placed in such a way to
be retrieved in a few decades after 1972.61 Scientists hoped to return to the surface and recover
various NASA tools and equipment to investigate how long-term exposure to the lunar surface
and space environment impacted these objects. However, scientists could not have known the
space program would not return in the planned time frame and the objects still await recovery.
For lunar orbital science, NASA scientists found the full potential of utilizing the SIM of
the CSM. The Lunar Sounder Experiment beamed HF and VHF magnetic impulses toward the
lunar surface in an effort to gain a geographic model of the lunar interior to 1.3 kilometers.62
Scientists hoped the orbit of the SIM would yield the most detailed map of the Moon’s interior to
date. The SIM also contained an Infrared Scanning Radiometer. Previously, a temperature map
of the Moon could only be done from earth. With the SIM, scientists located rock fields, crustal
surface differences, volcanic activity, and fissures that emitted hot gasses.63 The SIM also
contained a Far UV-Spectrometer that helped scientists measure atomic composition, density,
and scale height on the lunar surface. Finally, the SIM bay also contained a panoramic camera,
mapping cameras and a laser altimeter.64 The SIM on Apollo 17 allowed scientists to gain the
clearest and most complete picture of the Moon to date.
Due to the high volume of orbital experiments, NASA mission planners ordered Apollo
17 to stay in lunar orbit two additional days following rendezvous operations between the surface
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astronauts and the CM.65 During this time, the astronauts conducted the Light Flash Phenomenon
Experiment and the Biological Cosmic Ray Experiment. (BIOCARE) This passive study sought
to determine if cosmic ray particles injured non-regenerative cells in the eye and brain.66 The
experiment consisted of five mice with cosmic ray detectors implanted under their scalps. These
mice lived in an aluminum tube within the CM. Researchers designed the tube so there was no
effect of zero-g on the mice, and scientists analyzed the detectors upon return to Earth.
NASA’s final excursion to the Moon, Apollo 17, was a significant success. Faith in
scientist-astronauts soared when Schmitt recovered a lunar rock that was later called “the most
interesting sample retuned from the Moon.”67 Schmitt recovered Troctolite 76535 at station 6
and from it, scientists discovered that the Moon may have once had an acute magnetic field.68
The surface astronauts also found orange colored material that led scientists to discover the
sample was volcanic in origin.69 Apollo 17, the final lunar landing, holds many records for the
space program. The second EVA holds the record for the furthest and longest activity ever
carried out.70 The astronauts spent 7 hours and 37 minutes on the surface and covered over 1935
kilometers of terrain. For an agency created in the midst of the Cold War and driven by Cold
War objectives, Apollo 15, 16 and 17 transformed NASA into a scientific data gathering
powerhouse backed by scientists. NASA had pulled itself away from political rhetoric and
operated on missions of pure scientific curiosity. The tenacity of NASA administrators and
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scientists changed how science was seen within the agency’s doors. From Apollo 1 having a
small science package to Apollo 17 covering thousands of kilometers of the lunar surface and
deploying the most high-tech data gathering instruments to date, NASA changed science. The
personnel and scientists involved were not content serving as pawns of the power politics of the
Cold War. Apollo 17 ensured the lunar landing phase of Apollo finished strong, and it paved the
way for Skylab and the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project to complete NASA’s initial post-Moon
strategy.
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Chapter 4: Skylab: Maximizing Scientific Potential

I: Creation of America’s First Space Station

Following the successful completion of NASA’s manned lunar program, the space
agency moved to its next phase of manned spaceflight. The plans for what lay beyond Apollo
dated back to 1963, while NASA finished up Project Mercury. During this period, the Office of
Manned Spaceflight at NASA began advocating post-Apollo to the United States Congress. The
OMSF believed that ending the program after landing on the Moon would be a waste of the
resources that had been put into the space program thus far.1 Post-Apollo plans would justify the
massive spending on Apollo’s rockets, spacecraft, and launch facilities to conduct more missions
in order to produce more return on America’s investment. In many ways, NASA used its postApollo planning to keep itself relevant in a world no longer in awe of spaceflight. The 1964
President’s Report to Congress on US Space Activities reflected the opportunity the OMSF laid
out. The report examined three possibilities: Apollo spacecrafts and system could be used for
Earth and lunar missions, extension of the Apollo program with modification of existing systems
or new hardware development for new mission concepts.2 The president’s council on space
highlighted that these new mission concepts could take the form of Earth orbital operations,
lunar operation, and planetary operations. The following year, the council went into further detail
about the Apollo Applications Program (AAP), the name for NASA’s post-Apollo activities. In
1965, the president’s council defined the following as the goals of the AAP: “Develop
operational equipment and techniques, to obtain direct benefits to men, and to conduct further
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scientific exploration of space.”3 As discussed in chapter 1, NASA had not yet committed to
science as a cornerstone of its space program in the 1960s. However, the inclusion of science
objectives in the president’s report shows that the agency’s thinking about pushing scientific
discovery as a larger part of its plan. To accomplish the goals of AAP, the Apollo-Saturn systems
continued to be used. NASA and the president’s council narrowed its post-Apollo options to
building a space station with a shuttle system, missions returning to the Moon, and looking
toward Mars.4 However, the exact nature of AAP had not yet been defined.
AAP began to take on a clearer picture in 1966 when NASA reported to the President’s
Council on Space Activities that the agency planned to convert the second stage of the Saturn V
rocket into a habitable space station.5 An airlock allowed astronauts to live and work within an
“orbital workshop” that resided in low-Earth orbit. NASA made developmental strides toward
realizing a low-Earth orbit space station but did not want to commit to only one objective for
AAP. Yet, outside forces put the agency’s grand plans on halt and forced NASA to scale back its
post-Apollo hopes.
Following NASA’s peak budget years, the purse strings began to tighten after 1966,
beginning with the Apollo 1 fire. As discussed in previous chapters, after the investigation into
the fire and congressional hearing, budget allotments for NASA began decreasing with every
subsequent year. NASA’s administrators and leaders were forced to funnel as much money as
possible into the Apollo program. This did not leave much for developing and planning AAP.6
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George Mueller announced that AAP would serve as a bridge to the next space program rather
than stand out on its own and be a long-term program.7 AAP’s goals would no longer be on
equal priority with Apollo. The post-Apollo program took another hit when NASA scaled back
its goals and announced that the AAP would only include the orbital workshop with the Apollo
Telescope Mount and development of a low-cost transportation system.8 Fiscal 1968 would
signal the end of unrestricted spending for NASA and AAP took the largest cut. While Apollo’s
budget faced a 2% cut, AAP was cut 31%, and all other space science programs were cut 22%.9
This budget signaled a change in national priorities, and scientific exploration of space was now
low on that list. NASA would face further scrutiny in its post-Apollo objectives when the new
Nixon administration took office in 1969.
In early 1969, President Nixon created the Space Task Group to propose post-Apollo
alternatives and activities.10 The STG wanted NASA to pursue a balanced manned and
unmanned program. The president’s group advocated that the agency should adopt a long-range
goal to sustain itself for the next 8 years. The STG suggested that NASA commit to an earth
orbiting station, lunar base, and a manned mission to Mars by the 1980s, or an unmanned
mission to Mars to allow the agency to set a date for a manned mission, or finally, a space
station, shuttle vehicle, and setting a manned mission to mars to be completed before 1999.11
President Nixon was not very receptive to any of the proposed plans due to his focus on domestic
issues and solving the puzzle of ending the Vietnam War. As discussed previously, government
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support drained when public reaction to a Mars mission ran overwhelmingly negative in both the
general population and scientific community. NASA continued to work on the orbital workshop
concept, however beyond that, the agency did not know what the next step would be.
The end of the 1960’s and early 1970’s should have been a high point for NASA with the
realization of landing men on the Moon and five more successful landings. However, the
congressional historian on the House Committee on Science and Technology Ken Hechler
summed up the early 1970’s as “the worst of times for the space program.”12 He lamented the
wane of NASA’s triumphs:
By hindsight, it seems unlikely that even the strongest and most adept
mobilizations of the supporters of more manned flights to the Moon could have
successfully overcome the adverse feeling in the country in the early 1970’s.
Congress and the Nation could be persuaded to support Skylab, the space shuttle,
and a modest level of activity by NASA in other areas. But… Von Braun’s dream
of a manned flight to Mars was not in the cards for the 20th Century, at least.13

NASA faced low public interest, minimal governmental support, and mission cancellations in the
last years of Apollo. What resulted was a neutered AAP and no direction following the
program’s completion. However, as seen in the final stages of the Apollo manned lunar mission,
NASA used its remaining time to invest in scientific objectives to maximize scientific returns.
The orbital workshop, named Skylab, would be NASA’s conduit to show its full scientific
potential.
Mission planning for Skylab began in 1969. NASA wanted the first workshop mission to
be a 28-day duration mission with two more revisits that consisted of 56 days each.14 Skylab

12

Ken Hechler, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology (Washington
D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 1980), 313-314.
13
Ibid.
14
NASC, U.S. Aeronautics and Space Activities, 1969, 8.

62

would be completely outfitted on the ground, then launched into orbit. This method of dry
launching was not more cost effective than a wet launch, where the rocket stage was launched
then its contents, fuel and other propellants were vented, and the workshop was modified later.
NASA chose the dry method over wet for several reasons: modification of the S-IV had
progressed already, and cancellation of Apollo 18 through 20 freed up powerful boosters to send
a dry station into orbit.15 With the outfitting of Skylab progressing quickly with a goal of
launching in 1973, NASA administrations and mission planners set the objectives for the orbital
workshop:
The Program’s objectives are: to determine and evaluate man’s psychological
responses and aptitudes in space under zero gravity conditions and his postmission adaptation to the terrestrial environment through a series of progressively
longer missions; to develop and evaluate efficient technologies for utilizing man
in sensor operation, discrimination, data selection and evaluation, manual control,
maintenance and repair, assembly and installation of hardware components, and
mobility involved in various operations; to develop techniques for increasing
system’s life for long duration habitability and long duration mission control and
to investigate and develop techniques for inflight test and qualification of
advanced subsystems; to conduct astronomy and pother science, technology, and
application experiments in which man’s contribution is expected to improve
quality and/or yield of the results.16

Skylab was an ambitious endeavor planned by NASA. Based on Skylab’s objectives, NASA
brought together everything the agency learned in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs in
the outline for Skylab. As opposed to early American manned spaceflight, NASA planned
Skylab to be a melding of scientific and engineering milestones. This was evident in the space
administration’s strategy of loading up Skylab to maximize its scientific potential.
II: The Science of Skylab
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NASA outfitted the Skylab orbital workshop with the latest and most advanced scientific
data gathering devices created at the time. The standout among cutting-edge technology was the
Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM). The base of the ATM was a modified lunar module.17
Designers equipped the ATM with eight large telescopes that were used to observe various
astronomical phenomena. Two of the telescopes looked at the sun in visible wavelengths called
hydrogen-alpha radiation that came from excited hydrogen atoms in the solar atmosphere.18
Three telescopes were sensitive to extreme ultraviolet radiation, while two other telescopes were
sensitive to the x-ray portion of the spectrum. The final telescope in the ATM, the White Light
Coronagraph, observed the Sun’s corona when the workshop rotated to the dark side of the
Earth’s orbit without requiring total solar eclipse. The ATM was the first active solar observatory
launched by the United State. Previously, the Americans launched probes, such as the Pioneer
series, to observe the Sun. The benefit of the ATM to scientists was that now they actively
engaged in the objectives and operation. While Skylab was in orbit, the ground science team
debated the best use of the ATM for the 50 minutes of sunlight every 24 hours.19 When the
science team settled on a plan, it was sent to the crew and the orbital activity was completed.
This method of scientific activity was far different from early Apollo. The ATM and Skylab
dramatically demonstrated that NASA had unleashed their scientists. They now directly shaped
mission plans and objectives for the purposes of science experimentation.
The increased scientific potential of Skylab showed bright when NASA reused the
proven ALSEP concept from the moon landings. While the ATM looked outward, the Earth
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Resources Experiment Package (EREP) looked toward Earth. The package contained sensors
that allowed astronauts to gather data on geological, geographical, hydrological, agricultural,
forestry, oceanographic, and metrological studies of selected ground targets.20 NASA created the
EREP as an international project. In December 1970, NASA sent out invitations for participation
in space flight investigations to U.S. and foreign scientists.21 It received over 300 proposals and
hosted representatives from 40 countries and 16 international organizations at the International
Workshop on Earth Resources at the University of Michigan. The EREP became a symbol for
international scientific cooperation during the period of Cold War Détente.
High among its objectives, Skylab planned to measure human response to extended
period of weightlessness in an effort to plan for future deep space exploration missions. One way
to accomplish this goal was the creation of a medical plan that was completed during Skylab’s
operational tenure. To study heart function during exercise and simulated gravity, measurements
were taken while astronauts rode an exercise bike every 4 days in flight.22 Monitors gathered
data on heart rates, blood pressure, oxygen consumption, and carbon dioxide production and
compared the data taken earlier from the astronauts on Earth. Doctors also investigated metabolic
balance with measurements of all input and output along with pre- and post-flight bone loss
using gamma radiation experiments. They also investigated stress levels throughout the missions
through blood samples taken and frozen during flight. Following return to Earth, samples were
analyzed, and hormone levels were measured. Finally, to investigate motion sickness in
weightlessness and space flight, the astronaut’s vestibular balance system of the inner ear was
measured and evaluated. To accomplish many of these experiments during the Skylab missions,
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designers created a method of measuring weight in a weightless environment. Dr. Bill Thornton,
a scientist-astronaut, who would go on to be a support crew member for all three Skylab
missions and shuttle astronaut, formulated an experiment for mass measurement in a weightless
space.23 He found that if one measured the time a strip of steel oscillated when attached to an
object, the relative weight could be determined by observing the rate of oscillation. The higher
the oscillation, the more weight an object has. The Air Force went on and produced measuring
devices for Skylab, one for measuring astronauts and two to measure food, reserves, waste, and
other small items. NASA’s future after 1975 remained unclear, yet this did not stop the agency
from planning for its next step.
Many aspects of Skylab finally realized the fusing engineering and scientific techniques
and inquiry. Experiments on the habitability of a space station conducted during the three orbital
missions highlighted this fusing. While these experiments did not have active data collection,
scientists evaluated experiment planning based on astronaut feedback and testing of the
workshop’s amenities. Experiment M487, known as habitability/crew quarters experiment,
sought to “measure, evaluate and report habitability features of crew quarters and work areas of
Skylab in engineering terms useful to the design of future spacecraft.”24 Experiment M516,
known as crew activities/maintenance study, planned “to evaluate Skylab man-machine
relationships by gathering data concerning the crew’s capability to preform work in the zero-g
environment and long duration missions.”25 To gather data to satisfy these experiments’
parameters, astronauts tested restraints, handholds, equipment features, how doors open, and
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aesthetic design of modules. Feedback from astronauts allowed NASA to begin toying with ideas
for the next space program that would become the space shuttle and International Space Station.
Finally, NASA would foster scientific thinking and creativity in the next generation of
scientists by creating the Skylab Student Project. Sponsored by NASA and national science
teacher’s associations, the project allowed secondary education students to propose experiments
to be included and completed on Skylab.26 NASA sent requests for proposals to all fifty states
and nine overseas high schools. Students from 7th to 12th grade could propose experiments on
astronomy, botany, earth observation, microbiology, physics, physiology, and zoology.27
Twenty-five winners were chosen and of those, twenty-two flew on Skylab. For eleven of the
student experiments, NASA and its scientists developed new hardware to accomplish its
objectives. The Skylab Student Project was a high point for NASA’s scientific strategy on
Skylab. Pure scientific inquiry and imagination fueled the project. Jack H. Waite, the technical
assistant to the manager of the Space Science Project Office at Marshal Space Flight Center,
detailed why the student program was created:
The Skylab Student Program came into being because some of us involved in the space
program were concerned over the decline in interest of our youth in science and
engineering fields in ‘post-Apollo’ days…A number of NASA headquarters and field
center personnel discussed ways to stimulate the American youth interest in these fields.
It became apparent that they could, even should, be an integral part of the Skylab
Experiment Program.28
As seen previously, many government officials had a hard time condoning space activity for
reasons other than national prestige. The student program let NASA advance more reasons why
their program of science-based objectives and agency goals should continue. Generating
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American youth interest in the sciences was an area that allowed NASA to give back to the
nation for all the expenditures of going to the Moon. More simply, the Skylab Student Project
was a throwback to Administrator Webb’s push for “ideas first.” NASA designed Skylab with an
ambitious experimental schedule, and with that came problems.
III: Skylab: Science in Orbit
The Skylab workshop launched with high hopes on May 14, 1973, but the station became
immediately fraught with complications. During launch, one of the workshop’s sun shield/shades
tore off and the second pinned shut.29 Without these shades, the workshop’s power disappeared,
and the interior filled with toxic materials due to rising temperatures. NASA postponed the first
manned launch to Skylab from May 15 to the 25th in order to practice replacing and repairing the
solar shields. Following the successful launch and repair during SL-2, 80 percent of the planned
solar data was obtained, 12 of 15 EREP data runs were completed, including microwave
measurements of Hurricane Ava in the Pacific Ocean, and 16 medical experiments were run.30
SL-3 had even more success when, after overcoming motion sickness, the crew carried out
unscheduled tests and experiments that went over pre-mission planning.31 SL-4, had problems
keeping the trend of work up. The all-rookie crew found their tasks overwhelming and flight
controllers felt the crew took too long to accomplish basic objectives. Perhaps due to the success
of previous flights, the crew felt that mission control had asked too much of them and “mutinied”
by switching off communications with Earth for a while and relaxing.32 Following an airing of
grievances, mission control modified the workload schedule, and the mission ended up
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accomplishing more than originally planned. The crew returned home while Skylab remained in
orbit. NASA planned to return with the shuttle by the 1980s, but the craft was not ready in time,
and Skylab’s orbit degraded. The workshop reentered earth’s atmosphere in July 1979 and broke
up over South Africa and Western Australia.
Skylab’s legacy lies in the diversity of its scientific experiments and accomplishments.
Those outlined above were very different in scale and object. Some experiments cost millions
upon millions of dollars while one cost $3500 dollars and a few minutes of the astronaut’s
time.33 Don Lind, backup crew member for SL-3 and SL-4, noted his contribution to
experimentation on Skylab amounted to suggesting putting a piece of tinfoil on the struts of the
ATM so one could see an aurora caused by particles headed to Earth and an astronaut could grab
the piece on the way to retrieve the ATM’s film canister. NASA official William C. Schneider
said that this was his favorite experiment because it was one of the cheapest experiments that
flew in space. This willingness to try anything in the name of science became the hallmark of
Skylab and the late Apollo program. This new culture and total commitment to science within
NASA was the result of a Khunian “paradigm shift” and the conflict of ideas during the Space
Race. Unfortunately, NASA was unable to completely stave off being dragged back into the
politics of the Cold War and forced to sacrifice scientific achievement to satisfy political agenda.
IV: NASA Is Pulled Back into The Cold War
As previously seen in the culling of NASA’s budget and mission cancellations during the
early years of the Nixon administration, the space agency saw few plans come to fruition
following the final moon landing in 1972. Skylab used leftover spacecraft and repurposed them
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for a scientific mission. President Nixon and his administration moved their focus to ending
America’s involvement in Vietnam and to easing tensions with the Soviet Union. This policy of
Détente pulled NASA back into the political arena of the Cold War and ended the scientific
renaissance it experienced following the first moon landing.
The policy of Détente during the Cold War was born out of two powers seeking global
stability following decades of tension and wars. Both sides wanted to show that they could work
together in peace and become leaders without being enemies.34 Space cooperation became an
arm of this policy in 1970. The Soviet Academy of Sciences, the USSR’s space agency, and the
National Academy of Sciences began to talk about the possibility of collaboration.35 In May
1970, Dr. Phillip Hendler, the president of the National Academy of Sciences, brought a plan
before Mstislav Keldysh, the head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The proposal included a
docking device that could link up American and Soviet spacecraft in orbit.36 Keldysh agreed, and
the two superpowers began to work on a joint mission: the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP).
The proposed mission to be launched in 1975 involved the rendezvous and docking of a
leftover Apollo CSM and a Salyut space station.37 However, the Soviets became concerned they
would be unable to outfit and launch a station by 1975. The mission was changed to a linkup
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between an Apollo capsule and a Soyuz capsule using the docking module.38 Both nations had
complex set of reasons for joining and pursuing this joint mission. While America found success
going to the Moon, the USSR was successful at making stations in low Earth orbit and ferrying
cosmonauts up and down to them at a regular pace. However, following the moon landings and
end of Skylab, NASA found itself with no planned missions until the space shuttle that was
planned to first launch in 1981. This gap, along with the budget cuts, created a surplus of
astronauts and hardware for the United States. On the other side, the Soviets needed a highprofile mission following the Soyuz 11 accident in 1971.39 Following the reentry and landing of
the Soyuz 11 capsule, the three cosmonauts inside were found dead. A leaky valve in their
capsule caused the air to leak out and asphyxiated the cosmonauts.40 This tragedy, along with
economic woes in the Soviet Union caused its people to question their support for the Soviet
space program in the 1970s. A February 1971 Washington Post story recounted a large shipment
of rotten potatoes in the Soviet Union. An outraged Russian woman shouted “we have rockets,
right? Of course, right. We have Sputniks, right? Of course, right. They fly beautifully in outer
space. So, I say to you dear friends, why don’t we just send these rotten potatoes into outer space
too.”41 The Russian people were beginning to be irritated by the costly space program while
many went hungry in the streets. Both sides had reasons why they needed this joint mission to
work and look good.
Following the successful launch and rendezvous of the Apollo and Soyuz capsules on
July 17, 1975, the two spacecrafts docked, and made history when the two crews joined each
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other and shook hands. The ASTP was a profoundly political mission. Once again, the
engineering and political milestones and objectives vastly outweighed the scientific tasks.
Beholden to the US political system and forced by the Cold War, NASA to put aside its scientific
ambitions to serve as a political power play. However, the political nature of the mission did not
stop NASA from flexing its scientific discovery muscle. Over the next few days following the
docking, the crews carried out experiments, both separately and together.42 Apollo carried
equipment for twenty-three science and technical experiments. Soyuz carried six experiments in
astrophysics and biology. Five joint experiments were planned to be completed while docked and
undocked.
Following the successful completion of the ASTP, NASA looked forward to further
cooperation with the Soviets. In 1974, NASA proposed the shuttle would fly to a future Salyut
station and dock with it in order to test the building of an international space station.43 The
Russians responded that they wanted to wait and see the outcome of ASTP first. In May 1975,
George Low submitted an idea for an astronaut/cosmonaut swap and a space station linkup, but
again the Russians wanted to wait until ASTP was completed. Nothing new occurred until 1977
when the two nations signed an agreement to look at possible future missions in space
cooperation.
However, the change in political climate broke down this cooperation. President Jimmy
Carter grew increasingly concerned with the Soviet suppression of the Polish Solidarity
Movement.44 Conflicts between the US and USSR over Ethiopia, Angola, Shaba, Yemen,
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Cambodia, and Cuba occurred throughout the late 1970s. The Soviets, worried about US
attempts to militarize space, demanded that NASA discontinue its development of the shuttle
program if the 1977 agreement was to go ahead. This was seen as impossible for NASA and the
government who saw the shuttle as the next step in the US space program. Finally, the December
27, 1979, invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union broke the agreements. The age of
cooperation would be over, and the Cold War would reignite once again.
After six Moon landings and three Skylab missions, NASA had become adept at flying
science-based missions. Once the agency shed the moniker of fighting the Cold War, it became a
science-driven organization. NASA contributed cosmic amounts of data to the body of scientific
knowledge. However, it was unable to fully secure its freedom from political agendas and was
dragged back into the Cold War when the nation’s objectives required it to. Following the ASTP,
NASA hibernated and began work on the next phase of its manned space program but would not
launch humans back into space until 1981. Working on the shuttle kept the agency in business,
but it would not have the scientific triumphs that were seen from 1969 to 1973 for many years.
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NASA’s Internal Motives Versus Political Games
Throughout the 1960’s to the mid-1970’s, NASA remained a pawn of the grand Cold
War stratagem for the United States. Science was a pawn in the political game as well. NASA
explored increasing science’s priority in a broad space program, but the agency knew when to
pull back and realign itself with United States’ goals when called upon. As NASA moved around
the Cold War boardgame, the agency itself moved science in and out of mission prioritization.
The agency had to continually justify and modify its scientific pursuits according to its political
and economic benefactors. Because of this, NASA, in order to accomplish its scientific goals,
acquiesced and played the game of power politics depending on the stage of the Cold War.
Positivist historians of the early 20th century would have viewed NASA’s science endeavors in a
vacuum, but the agency’s department heads and scientists were not immune or left alone by the
political context of the Cold War. However, despite the constant economic and political changes
of those 15 years, NASA personnel completed political engineering objectives and accomplish a
comprehensive scientific program.
The first Moon landing was a mission of engineering triumph, but it was a triumph of
politics over science. However, as each Apollo moon landing succeeded, NASA’s science
strategy became bolder. This was due in part to fewer eyes watching following the first lunar
landing in 1969. NASA proved itself and made flying missions to the moon “routine.” This
allowed it to increase stays on the lunar surface, equip the astronauts with new tools and a
vehicle, and increased the complexity of scientific experiments deployed and tested. All of this
work culminated in Skylab, which was a pure scientific endeavor by NASA. Unburdened by
political games, NASA pushed its science program further than ever. Later, the Cold War pulled
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NASA back into the political arena when it was asked to collaborate with the USSR in ApolloSoyuz and the agency shifted again.
NASA’s style of bending to politics would continue to serve it long after completion of the
Apollo Program. The space shuttle was created in response to economic uncertainties of the
1980s. And once the public no longer had a love affair with space exploration, NASA searched
for other avenues of spaceflight. The boom of private space ventures in the new millennium has
led NASA to partner and shift some of the economic burden off the taxpayers. This could allow a
new Space Race between private companies with NASA footing the experience and reaping the
scientific benefits as seen during the race to the Moon in the 1960’s.
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